Skip to main content

Bluebox-ng beta released

I've just pushed the last changes to Bluebox-ng repo to get what we consider a beta version. It's not yet finished but it's much more stable than the previous release. Here there is a resume of the changelog:

  • IPv6 support. I would like to thank Olle E. Johansson (@oej) because of his research in SIP and IPv6, it did my work really easy.
  • Exploitsearch.net API support.
  • DNS module finished.
  • Nicer outputs.
  • Simpler setup process.
  • A network host/port scanner (Evilscan).
  • Dirscan-node upgraded to version 0.5.
  • Added some numerical lists (with different paddings) to use with brute-force modules.
  • Host list files and port ranges support included in SipScan module.
  • Solved SipBrutePass module problem with too much asyncronous requests.
  • A lot of refinements in the whole code.



I want to say that we've decided to re-define the project like a "VoIP/UC vulnerability scanner", this way we can work more focused. Our idea is to write a tool to test in an automatic way our deployments. There are several options when we think in other environments such as the web (Skipfish, Nikto, W3af, etc), but we've not anything similar in VoIP.

For now we have a bunch of tools (modules) that do the job in a comfortable (but indepentent) way. So, it's time to join all of them to automate the different tasks needed when we deploy an specific VoIP penetration test.

Finally we hope to present the first stable version at GSICKMINDS (A Coruña, 24-25-26 October), a great security event which I recommend to everyone. We're going to have here some security pr0n stars and we're in one of best places in the world to enjoy a few days. ;)
Labels:

Popular posts from this blog

SIP INVITE attack with Metasploit

Some days ago my friend  @pepeluxx  wrote  another post  about INVITE attacks. He spoke about a  @sinologic   project  which allows to everybody passing some security tests to SIP servers. Furthermore he also published a perl script to do the same task. So I implemented it on Metasploit because I think It could be really useful during a pentesting. It’s interesting because these attacks are really dangerous, normally, attackers try to call to expensive locations. This target numbers often have special charges and they make money with this. Here there are two well known examples: http://blog.sipvicious.org/2010/12/11-million-euro-loss-in-voip-fraud-and.html http://snapvoip.blogspot.com.es/2009/02/calls-to-cuba-and-voip-attacks.html I’m not going to deep in this vector because of being a well known (and old!!) one. Basically the attacker tries to make a call using a misconfigured PBX. This is allowed because  SIP RFC  says that an ...
Read more

Flooding Asterisk, Freeswitch and Kamailio with Metasploit

Hi, it has been a long time since my last post because of my new job and my final year project ("VoIP denegation of service attacks" for curious) but there is something I found during my tests with  Freeswitch ,  Kamailio  and  Asterisk  that I want to share. NOTE: Really, guys of  Security By Default  blog published us (my good friend Roi Mallo and me) two articles about how to develop modules for Metasploit framework, another two are coming.  ;) During my project, among others, I developed a Metasploit module which can flood SIP protocol with common frames (INVITE, OPTIONS, REGISTER, BYE), I wrote it at Quobis (nice job ;) in order to use it for some private tests because actual software didn´t fit our needs, so we are going to probe how is the behavior of different GPL VoIP servers against this kind of attacks: - Asterisk: I think it needs no introduction, the famous softswitch/PBX software. - Freeswitch: It´s a newer soft...
Read more

SIP extension enumeration in Bluebox-ng

There are some well known SIP extension enumeration vulnerabilities in different VoIP servers, specially in Asterisk. This brute-force vector is based on the study of the authentication responses of the target server. Sometimes its replies are different in the case that the client uses a valid extension, so it's easy to discover them. This vector is normally classified as a low security risk. Moreover we're moving towards a federated SIP environment , in which the extension is the public email address of the user. But it's still important in some cases: To guide next steps during a penetration test. In example, you can use the discovered extension to reduce the number of attempts in the phase of SIP extensión brute-force. Some RCE (Remote Code Execution) exploits need a valid extension to work. After a little research, these are the known vulns: CVE-2009-3727 : It's quite old and it's practically not present in real environments. It's still not imple...
Read more